Creative hubs and cultural policies: a comparison between Brazil and the United Kingdom

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ABSTRACT

This article presents a comparative analysis of ten creative hubs located in London, Birmingham, and São Paulo. It explores how cultural policies in the UK and Brazil have constituted in distinct ways the boundaries between ‘culture’ and ‘innovation’. Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of ‘field’, ‘habitus’, and ‘capital’ inform this analysis and its account of the ‘cultural-production subfield’ and the ‘innovation-production subfield’ within the creative economies and cultural policies of the UK and Brazil. The article also draws on Pier Luigi Sacco’s cultural history and theory to make an argument about the key factors underpinning recent changes in cultural policy.

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Introduction

This article draws on FAPESP-funded research on ‘Agglomeration and collaboration networks for the Cultural Economy - a comparison between creative work in Brazil and the United Kingdom’ based in the School of Communications and Arts of the University of São Paulo and undertaken in collaboration with the Network: Queen Mary University of London’s Centre for the Creative and Cultural Economy. The research presented in this article also draws on the findings of a 2017 AHRC-funded project ‘Creative Hubs and Urban Development Goals (UK/Brazil) which suggested that the cultural and creative production field involved two distinct subfields: a) the subfield of innovation production, and b) the subfield of cultural production (Shiach et al, 2017).

Since 2017, ten case studies involving creative hubs located in São Paulo, London, and Birmingham have been undertaken to test this hypothesis and understand the influence of cultural policies in both subfields in the two different national contexts. This article presents a comparative analysis of ten creative hubs located in London, Birmingham, and São Paulo. It explores how cultural policies in the UK and Brazil have constituted in distinct ways the boundaries and possible convergences between a ‘Cultural Production Subfield’ and an ‘Innovation Production Subfield’. The objective of this research was specifically to develop a categorization that would aid analysis of the productive practices of cultural and creative entrepreneurs who join in communities of practice in the form of co-working spaces, incubators, cultural centers, and artistic collectives and thus to understand the similarities and differences between two production ecosystems.

The article draws on Pier Luigi Sacco’s cultural history and theory to make an argument about the key factors underpinning recent changes in cultural policy. Pierre Bourdieu’s concepts of ‘field’, ‘habitus’, and ‘capital’ also inform this analysis and its account of the ‘cultural-production subfield’ and the ‘innovation-production subfield’ within both the creative economies and the cultural policies of the UK and Brazil. These two countries were chosen for a number of reasons. Firstly, the earlier AHRC-funded project had identified the importance of broader economic and cultural histories in understanding the development of cultural policies in these two countries. Secondly, this comparison could lay the basis for a broader international comparison focussed on Europe and South America. And finally each country provided examples of hubs established on the basis of radically distinct economic and cultural framings of the creative economy. All the hubs studied were physical spaces that agglomerated micro-businesses, entrepreneurs and freelancers operating in Cultural and Creative Production Field.

Data collection was done through 26 interviews lasting 20-40 minutes using semi-structured questions. Ethnographic research was also undertaken, involving participation in events, workshops, and exhibitions in each Hub. The research has also drawn on information from social networks, websites, and secondary data, including public documents and reports. Bourdieu’s concepts of field, habitus, and capital were used to aid in the identification of key differences between the businesses in the cultural-production subfield and in the innovation-production subfield operating within these hubs. Three distinct levels of analysis were undertaken.

This article addresses the findings from three different levels of analysis. 1. Micro-level - Capital Analysis – Mapping the diversity and specificity from each Hub using Bourdieu’s concepts of capital to describe the profiles of the Hubs; their networks and connection; and identify how they access financial capital. 2. Medium-level - Habitus analysis to understand the characteristics of a) the cultural production subfield and b) the innovation production subfield. The Hubs were separated by groups observing the differences between their ecosystem in terms of capital exchanges, work dynamics, behaviour, ideology, relationship with the local community, public space, government, private institutions, and market 3. Macro-level - Field analysis – Through analysis drawing on the concepts of ‘Capital’ and ‘Habitus’ programmes and funding from government and private companies were used to comprehend how both countries circumscribe their Cultural and Creative Production Field.

These levels generated different readings: the first one was an individual description of each Hub, highlighting their cultural capital (history, profiles of agents, sectors of activity, values, motivations), their social capital (contact and relationship networks), their financial capital, their business models, and the mechanisms through which they accessed financial resources. In the second level of analysis, it was possible to establish some criteria to separate the creative hubs into subfields, and describe the similarities and differences between them (intermediate analysis). Finally at the third level, the microanalysis of the Hubs, it was possible to identify how Creative Hubs access financial resources and to verify which of them received...
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By identifying the types of financing accessed by the Hubs, as well as the subfield to which they belong, it was possible to identify some characteristics of the local and national public policies (cultural or not) of the countries and contexts of which the Hubs are part.

As a result, it was possible to identify an important difference between the public policies of the United Kingdom and Brazil, and thus to propose the hypothesis that in Brazil cultural policies during the last ten years were closely informed by social movements, minorities, cultural diversity, and cultural citizenship. While British policies, in the same period, were more closely linked to economic development, skills development and increasing job opportunities. The research also showed that local cultural policies directly shape the forms of work organization within the Cultural and Creative Production Field.

Framing the cultural and creative industries in international cultural policies: Culture 1.0 to Culture 3.0.

This article draws on the history of cultural policies offered by works such as ‘From Culture 1.0 to Culture 3.0: Three Socio-Technical Regimes of Social and Economic Value Creation through Culture, and Their Impact on European Cohesion Policies’ by culture economist Pier Luigi Sacco and co-authors Guido Ferilli and Giorgio Tavano Blessi (2018), and Dave O’Brien’s, Cultural Policy: Management, Value and Modernity in the Creative Industries (2014). These works offered significant insights into the periods and paradigms of cultural policies from 1960 to 2020, and a framework to understand how the value of the arts, culture and creativity was related to excellence, social inclusion and economic development over these decades.

FIGURE 1. Sacco and O’Brien: Cultural Analyses
Source: Authors’ own elaboration, based on Sacco, Ferilli & Blessi (2018) and O’Brien (2014).
Culture 1.0, Sacco, Ferilli and Blessi argue, was a period when public subsidies sought to democratise access to the arts (Sacco, Ferilli & Blessi, 2018). Culture 1.0 was based on the model of Germanic romantic art, where the art field was separated from the economic field (and thus from the market). The concept of art was legitimised by specialists who attributed values based on levels of artistic excellence – Intrinsic value. Cultural policies justified their subsidy through the idea of the externalities of the arts. The state would be responsible for enhancing the externalities and democratising access to the arts. The symbolic capital of the arts field put value on artistic excellence, enlightenment and spiritual cultivation, which constituted the ‘habitus’ of western civilisation. In this period, these authors argue, culture was associated with an idea of ‘the good life’, and according to O’Brien (2014), this concept of excellence reflected a conception of culture as the high-point of civilisation within a welfare state. This first phase is characterised by the early stage of cultural policies and started with the creation of funding agencies for culture in the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States and the creation of the Ministère d’État chargé des Affaires culturelles in France.

The transition from Culture 1.0 to Culture 2.0 can be defined as a change in the symbolic capital of the arts field from the value of excellence for culture towards the valuing of social inclusion and cultural development. Since the 1970s some cultural policies have drawn on an anthropological concept of culture, understanding it as a resource for social transformation (O’Brien, 2014). Framed in relation to the idea of cultural development (Girard & Gentil, 1972), culture becomes a space with particular importance for minorities (O’Brien, 2014). Following this model, cultural policies framed culture as a resource to transform lives and increase the participation of excluded groups (O’Brien, 2014), and culture also came to be associated with human and civil rights and to be represented as a resource to promote social inclusion and urban regeneration. This led to policies that promoted cultural production networks at local, regional and global levels.

Sacco, Ferilli, and Blessi (2018), have pointed out some key factors that fostered this transition from Culture 1.0 to Culture 2.0: industrialised forms of culture became more profitable; audiences expanded; and culture became increasingly linked to entertainment. In that time, communication and media theories (Miège, 1987) increasingly revealed the hegemony of North American cultural industries, which typically displayed asymmetric economic powers, and this influenced national governments to create instruments to protect their internal cultural market.

The transition from Culture 1.0 to Culture 2.0 was thus characterised by a new relationship between ‘the art field’ and ‘the economic and political field’. Cultural policies incorporated new agents and institutions from sectors such as publishing, cinema, music, television, and radio in their scope. The central policy issues for Culture 2.0 became copyright; culture as entertainment; growing markets and audiences. The second paradigm (Culture 2.0) comprise the arts field, but also expanded to address a broader cultural field. The Cultural Production Field here incorporates the idea of externalities based on the welfare state to justify broadening the concept from art to culture.

The instrumental and institutional value of culture was then considered also as the public value of culture (Yoon, 2010). The ‘public value of culture’ and a focus on the audience, was the way found by the state to overcome the elitist hierarchy of taste, and thus to attribute to cultural production collective values of representation of ‘citizenship’, ‘diversity’, ‘inclusion’ and ‘well-being’ (Yoon, 2010). This account of the "public value of culture" drove cultural policies and produced a discursive change in response to increasingly individualized demands (Yoon, 2010).

In the past decade, Sacco, Ferilli and Blessi (2018) argue, we have witnessed a further transition from Culture 2.0 to Culture 3.0, driven by two concurrent streams of innovation: digital content production and digital connectivity. In Culture 3.0, communities have been formed and organised through a collapse of the separation between producers and audience. This collapse is associated with a move from passive participation to active participation of social actors in the cultural and creative production field. This change
introduced new challenges for cultural policymakers. To these challenges is added the associated ‘culturalization’ of the economy (Lipovetsky & Serroy, 2015; Scott & Urry, 1994) which has brought cultural production into everyday life. Culture 3.0 has been marked by technological innovations and the globally competitive need for constant innovation with new products and processes.

For Sacco, Ferrilli and Blessi (2018), cultural participation generates indirect macroeconomic consequences, which are not insignificant when compared to the economic effects of cultural and creative industries. In this perspective, the authors point to the importance of an interdisciplinary point of view to understand the interfaces of creativity and economics, sociology, medicine, psychology, environment, art, technology, education, politics (Sacco, Ferrilli & Blessi, 2018). The symbolic value of creativity here constitutes the cultural dimension of sustainable development. At the same time, cultural participation is a central element for cultural policies, with states considering cultural participation when creating public policies related to innovation, well-being and sustainability, social cohesion, entrepreneurship, education, and soft power, integrating them in the sustainable development goals agenda (see United Nations Agenda 2030). Cultural policies start to value engagement through networks of cultural and creative productions; individual and collective learning; innovative practices transformed into social technologies; and in the forms of reception, enjoyment and reproduction of cultural content.

UNESCO has recently ensured that the role of culture is recognized through a majority of its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Within the framework of action of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), approved by the United Nations in September 2015, the international development agenda refers to culture for the first time. “Safeguarding and promoting culture directly contribute to many of the SDGs - safe and sustainable cities, decent work and economic growth, reducing inequalities, the environment, promoting gender equality, and peaceful and inclusive societies” (UNESCO, 2018). UNCTAD published in 2018 its Creative Economy Programme Development through Creativity, where it recognises the development dimension of the creative economy, and proposes meaningful tools for fostering development gains towards the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals (UNCTAD, 2018).

Culture 3.0 represents a change in symbolic capital from ‘culture’ to ‘creativity’. To incorporate the value of creativity within the scope of cultural policies has required a repositioning of the cultural and creative production field as part of the economic field. This aspect has involved a move towards something like Joseph Schumpeter’s point of view, which considers creativity as a driver of entrepreneurship and innovation, and the key to economic development (Graff, 2016). The “public value of culture” is being replaced in policy discourses by the value of engagement. This value of engagement is produced by the cultural participation of agents organised in networks which establish both monetary and non-monetary exchanges. These networks dynamise different ecosystems which operate at global, regional, national, local and hyperlocal scales. The “value of engagement” thus becomes the driver of a cultural policy for entrepreneurship and is being established through a discursive change in response to the increasing demands for new digital and business solutions.

This is linked to a radical restructuring of the global economy towards a knowledge economy as discussed by Peter Drucker (1968). He emphasizes the importance of knowledge in transforming the economy in the twentieth century. He writes that “the base of the work will be knowledge, and the productivity of the worker will depend on his ability to put into practice concepts, ideas, theories” (Drucker, 1968). The importance of this expansion of the Cultural Production Field to the Cultural and Creative Production field is reinforced in the works of Richard Florida. Drucker influenced Richard Florida in the creation of his concept of ‘the creative class’, which identified computer scientists, engineers, chemists, biologists, mathematicians, and inventors as workers within the Cultural and Creative Production
Field, justifying the importance of these professionals for economic development (Florida, 2002).

The third paradigm (Culture 3.0) can be understood as an expanded Cultural and Creative Production Field, where organisations from the creative industries and from innovation sectors became part of the scope of cultural policies. Businesses from fashion, design, advertising, leisure, gastronomy, video games, marketing, software development, applications and digital platforms, data science, artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, augmented reality, new technology-based businesses all became part of Cultural and Creative Production Field. The values associated with creativity and culture within cultural policy do remain contested, however, and the practices of agents from the Subfield of Cultural Production are in fact often in tension with those from the Subfield of Innovation Production (Ley, 2003).

This tension occurs because agents in the field of innovative production prioritise activities with (large scale) organisations seeking profit, while agents in the field of cultural production prioritise the construction of communities supported by a sense of belonging, identity and empowerment through public space (Shiach et al, 2017). Policy responses to this constitutive tension are related to how different countries have identified the role of arts, culture, and creativity in relation to excellence, social inclusion, and economic growth.

**Networks and Hubs**

The contribution of the cultural and creative industries (CCI) to the Gross Domestic Product of countries in both the Global North and Global South is very significant: £101.5 billion in the UK (UK Creative Industries Federation, 2018); $586.7 billion in the US (NEA, 2013), and R$155.6 billion in Brazil (FIRJAN, 2016). With the development of digital technologies, an important link has been established between ‘culture’ and ‘innovation’ within what is understood as ‘information’ or ‘knowledge’ societies (Castells, 2000; Lash & Ury, 1994; Drucker, 1968), which have experienced an increasing convergence of telecommunications, information, and internet industries (Hesmondalgh, 2015). Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) occupy an essential role in the production, circulation, and distribution of symbolic content and CCI organisations are shifting from a hierarchical vertically integrated organisational architecture to networked and contractual relations (Hesmondalgh, 2015) which allow them to pursue flexibility through the use of atypical forms of employment (Savanović & Orel, 2018). CCI organisations tend to employ individuals for a specific set of tasks in a pre-set timeframe to cut costs, enable innovation and optimise their work process and overall performance (Savanović & Orel, 2018). These shifts have in turn been associated with the creation of new types of workspaces, including creative hubs.

Cultural networks have gained importance within cultural policies in recent years. According to Uzelac (2016), networks are infrastructures that support the cultural and creative sector. Through cultural networks, creative professionals have sought to coordinate an intricate work dynamic (Uzelac, 2016). The most significant economic agents within CCI are micro-businesses, entrepreneurs and freelancers (NEA, 2013; UK Creative Industries Federation, 2018; FIRJAN 2016), working on projects within temporary networks for the production, circulation, distribution, and consumption of cultural and creative goods and services (Hutton & Pratt 2009). This has led to the emergence of an ecosystem of coworking spaces and communities (Savanović & Orel, 2018) through which micro-businesses, entrepreneurs and freelancers access networks of potential collaborators, job opportunities and training.

More than any other industry sector, the CCI is characterised by the prevalence of flexible and fragmented working arrangements that Lazzarato (2014) calls ‘internment work’. The dynamics of production within the CCI thus tend to promote the formation of agglomerations or nodes known as creative hubs. Creative hubs exist in many forms, such as co-working spaces, business incubators, cultural centres, training institutions, and online platforms (Virani, 2014). This article investigates specifically hubs that exist as physical spaces and provide a form of urban agglomeration that promotes connections between entrepreneurs, micro-, small- and medium-sized enterprises, and freelancers (Virani, 2014). These spaces offer collaborative environments, coworking spaces, lounge areas serving as galleries, theatres, cafés or self-service bars, and play an essential role in building social cohesion within the local area and communities (Savanović & Orel, 2018).

**Policy development the UK and Brazil**

The idea of the ‘Creative Industries’ has been important for policy development in the UK since the late-1990s, as part of a broader project to define and deliver...
'Creative Britain'. The CCI have been seen as central to economic growth from this point, and understood as part of a larger project to reposition the UK as a global creative centre. 'Creative Britain' combined urban development policies with the promotion of creativity, culture and innovation, and sought to increase the value of intellectual property, strengthen the art market, and increase employment and tourism. This brought profound changes to cultural policies in the UK, evidenced particularly by the creation of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) in 1997, which was later re-named the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport in 2017. For the cultural policies of the UK, the CCI have been increasingly understood as an economic sector that produces social impacts. During the past twenty years of working within this cultural policy framework, and with the increasing importance of the digital sector in the economy in general, the relations between creativity and economic growth have been energetically promoted across a range of policy contexts in the UK.

This convergence between the subfields of cultural production and innovation production is central to the overall argument of the UK's "Industrial Strategy – White Paper", published in March 2018. This paper argues for the strategic importance of the CCI for future economic growth across the UK, with particular reference to audio-visual industries, information technology, gaming and advertising sectors. In parallel with the new Industrial Strategy, the Cultural Development Fund was created by Arts Council England and investment in creative clusters was also undertaken by the Arts and Humanities Research Council, to strengthen local partnerships between creative businesses; museums and galleries; universities; and local government. These partnerships were designed to build on the central role of hubs by strengthening clusters that could support innovation and offer advice on finance, new market opportunities and IP.

These significant developments demonstrate a convergence between the fields of cultural production and of innovation production, organised through key networks or geographical clusters that foster both innovation and knowledge exchange. They can also be understood as an expression of the logic of what Sacco described as 'culture 3.0' where cultural policies become part of the economic field. The relationship between cultural policies and innovation policies that was found in the UK is much less obvious in the Brazilian context. The separation between the innovation and cultural subfields in the Brazilian policy context to some extent reflects the aims and methods of PRONAC, the National Cultural Funding Programme. PRONAC is divided into two main strands: direct funding in which the national government invests public money; and incentive projects which involve tax relief for private companies to enable investment in cultural projects. This programme was created in 1991, and its funding system has been basically the same since this period. However, in 2003 the national government launched a social participation plan to develop what was called the National Cultural Plan. This focuses on Brazilian diversity, and related symbolic, social, and economic cultural values. One part of this plan is the ‘points of culture’ initiative, considered by many a model cultural policy for South America.

The National Cultural Plan was built on an anthropological understanding of culture, valuing its social and symbolic dimension, but less focussed on its economic impacts. This has produced a prioritisation for funding of projects in the visual arts, cinema, music, heritage, theatre, literature area. It has not, however, sought to build a strong relationship with the innovation production subfield. From 1995 cultural policies were managed by the Ministry of Culture, but this Ministry has now been closed, and its cultural policies have been dismantled. Innovation policies in Brazil have no political or institutional connection to cultural policies.
at this point, having been managed by the Innovation, Technology and Science Ministry (recently integrated into the Communication Ministry which has created some programmes to invest in start-ups). The political and economic crises which Brazil has experienced in recent years makes it hard to imagine any effective integration of the innovation and cultural subfields in the near future.

Bourdieu and the Cultural and Creative Production Field

Bourdieu studied the field of cultural production between 1968 and 1983, and his insights into the Cultural Production Field were published in the book, in 1993. The field of cultural production, according to Bourdieu (1993), is a social space, which has its own rules, principles and hierarchies. Bourdieu shows that the field of power (political and economic) and the field of production as a whole represent the "social space of the field" (Bourdieu, 1993).

The social formation, according to Bourdieu, is structured by a series of fields. Each one is defined as a structured social space with its laws of operation, and its relationship of forces. The field, according to Bourdieu (2001), is social space where agents and institutions occupy positions to control or modify the field (Bourdieu, 1993). The field is defined based on several networks of relationships and agents that position themselves differently and dispute symbolic, political and economic forces, establishing conflicts and tensions among their members. These disputes are reflections of the general division of classes in society represented by economic and political power on the one hand and cultural power on the other. In other words, society is structured around an opposition between "economic" and "cultural" power (Bourdieu, 1993), while economic and cultural powers are structured around the opposition between a "heteronomous" force represented by economic and political capital (forces outside the field - field of power) and the "autonomous" forces that represent the specific capital of each field (Benson, 1999). Each field is identified according to its specific capital that will determine the nature of the field.

According to Bourdieu, the habitus is the "primacy of practical reason", a system of provisions that are socially constituted (Bourdieu 2001). The habitus is several devices operated under a coherent logic and is also a system where agents integrate the past experiences and learning present in an array of perception and appreciation (Garnham & Williams, 1980). The exercise of habitus is built on principles, purpose and value and is not an individual phenomenon. Although internalised by the individual, it is recognised by a group that shares the same values through interaction in a social group (Garnham & Williams, 1980). To explain the structures of social practice, Bourdieu uses the concept of capital: capital in all its forms, not just that recognised by economic theory, as economic theory imposed a commercial definition for all social practices. According to Bourdieu (1986), the concept of capital is defined by volume (quantity) and structure (types of capital). He argued that cultural capital can be presented in three fundamental aspects: 1) economic capital, which is immediately and directly convertible into money; 2) social capital composed of connections and networks of contacts that can be established by family, social or work relationships. And finally, the last type of capital, cultural capital that also can be understood by three aspects: a) cultural capital incorporated through the way of life, belief, taste, behaviour; b) institutionalised cultural capital acquired by formal education; c) cultural capital objectified represented by possessions of symbolic value in the field.

Cultural and social capital can also be converted into economic capital, depending on the agent's position in the field. Cultural capital, when recognised by the agents that hold the dominant social capitals in the field, is transformed into symbolic capital specific of the field and can be converted into economic capital. Cultural and social capital present forms of value due to their power of conversion into symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 2001).

Bourdieu defines Cultural Production Field through the relationship between two subfields: the small scale production subfield (or "restricted production" or art field) and the large scale production subfield (large production – large production scale or cultural industries) (Bourdieu, 1993; Hesmondhalgh, 2006; Benson, 1999). Small-scale or restricted production is a production field for producers, with a relatively high degree of "autonomy", but never total autonomy. Mass production is a large-scale production field occupied by agents with a low level of autonomy, and a high level of heteronomy (subject to external market rules) but with a certain level of autonomy. Bourdieu writes about small-scale production as geared towards the production of "pure" artistic products, and mass production as geared towards the production of commercial, cultural goods.
(Hesmondhalgh, 2006). The small-scale production subfield, in turn, involves low levels of economic capital and very high levels of symbolic capital. On the other hand, the subfield of cultural mass production involves, through higher sales, higher levels of economic capital (Hesmondhalgh, 2006).

As David Hesmondhalgh argues, Bourdieu has devoted himself to studying the field of small-scale production in greater depth but has made few contributions concerning aspects of the symbolic logics that operate in the cultural industries subfield related to the transformations that occur after 1980 (Hesmondhalgh, 2006). Hesmondhalgh suggests that the cultural industries after 1980 started to adopt a regime of segmentation of their programming and production of symbolic content, trying to address different segments of the population including groups with more refined tastes, which generated the idea of quality mass production (such as classical music programs, documentaries on art, culture, among others) (Hesmondhalgh, 2006).

Cultural policies developed within different national contexts in recent decades have assigned value to the cultural and creative industries in diverse ways, which are related to how they understand the relations between excellence, social inclusion, wellbeing, and economic development (O’Brien, 2014). Bourdieu developed his theory in the period of Culture 1.0, whose art of excellence represented the scope of cultural policies directed by the paradigm of democratisation of access to the arts. Culture 2.0 is characterised by the first expansion of the field with the insertion of cultural industries as part of the scope of cultural policies. Agents working in the field of cultural industries were able to benefit from public subsidies that promoted a new organisation in the field.

The second expansion (Culture 3.0) of the field, from culture to creativity, inserted new sectors (creative industries and the innovation sector) into the scope of cultural policies and caused a reorganisation in the social sphere of cultural production with the entry of new agents. Agents, previously positioned between the spheres of small-scale production (legitimate and non-commercial arts) and large-scale production (some agents from the cultural industries), began to dispute spaces and positions in the field, with agents from other sectors, previously not contemplated by cultural policies. Thus we understand that the Cultural and Creative Production Field comprise two spheres or subfields: the cultural production subfield (arts, cultural industries) and the innovation production subfield (creative industries and information and communication technology innovation).

The Cultural and Creative Production Field comprises a set of sectors that, over the last 60 years, have been incorporated into the scope of cultural policies. The Cultural and Creative Production Field includes four groups of sectors (arts, cultural industries,
creative industries and innovation). Each one has constituted its own rules and hierarchies and is a social space through which agents dispute economic, political and symbolic forces. The agents dispute the positions through a non-monetary exchange of cultural and social capital. The exchange of cultural and social capital takes place regardless of the positions that the agents occupy in the Field. The agents who occupy privileged positions determine the habitus of the field. The Field is dynamized by two movements, one that represents the symbolic logic of the field and another that represents an economic logic of the field.

The Cultural and Creative Production Field has two types of ecosystems (subfields), where agents and institutions organize themselves. Ecosystems maintain the specific social division of each subfield: the cultural production ecosystem, with the heteronomous forces maintained by the habitus of institutions, artists and producers with recognition and reputation, who access finance and prizes converted into economic capital, and those agents with less prestige who seek to modify the dominant habitus. The innovation production ecosystem maintains the heteronomous forces of the subfield – the large companies and conglomerates – which dictate the rules of the market, and small producers who assume the risks and seek to achieve access to capitals by replicating the rules or trying to create disruptive means to access the market and economic capital. Thus, the Cultural and Creative Production Field presents two forces: a) a force whose processes, codes, and skills are reproduced in the logics of symbolic exchanges and for whom the transformation of social and cultural capital into symbolic capital promotes access to economic capital; and b) the logic of the large-scale market, whose processes, codes and skills are reproduced in a commercial sense that supports direct access to financial capital.

The Matrix below summarises the positions of agents of production within the field of cultural and creative production according to their habitus, with reference to their dynamics of capital exchange and the forms of symbolic capital valued by their networks. The Matrix is a representation of the extensive Cultural and Creative Production Field and is divided into four circles and four quadrants. The circles are divided into different colours: blue - the arts sector; yellow - Cultural Industries; green - Creative Industries sector and orange - Innovation sector. The right and left quadrants indicate the production subfield in which the agents are positioned, and the upper or lower quadrants indicate their levels of symbolic power and economic power. Each agent is positioned in the Matrix according to the sectors, while quadrants indicate the subfields, the levels of symbolic power and economic power.

**FIGURE 3. MATRIX OF CULTURAL AND CREATIVE PRODUCTION FIELD**
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
Micro-level - Capital analysis

Micro-level analyses of data were conducted to identify the different types of capital produced and valued within each hub (cultural/social/economic). Drawing on factors such as the history of the hubs; their business models; their modes of knowledge exchange; the sub-sectors they represented; their networks; and how they accessed funding and investment, these three different forms of capital were identified and evaluated. The cultural capital identified was then further divided into ‘embodied’, ‘objectified’, and ‘institutionalised’ forms, with a particular focus on ‘habitus’, which was understood, following Bourdieu, as an embodied state of cultural capital that forms an integral part of an individual and ‘cannot be transmitted instantaneously by gift or bequest, purchase or exchange’ (Bourdieu,1986).

The Cases Studies: Ten Hubs

• Hub 1 (UK) – a cultural centre based in an old leather factory with 6,000 m² space accommodating three cinemas, three live performance spaces, and 24 private creative businesses that rent space to work inside the cultural centre.
• Hub 2 (UK) – offers events, yoga, and workshops. It promotes local festivals and events. It is based in a multi-functional venue that boasts 8,000 square feet space, 1,700–2,200 ft² art gallery space, 19 studios units, and a café. Its tenants’ community has 13 tenants, most of them are young artists with careers of 5 or more years.
• Hub 3 (UK) – is a building of 30,000 m² that include 40 workshops and studios and four communal areas for exhibitions. The community includes 50 tenants who are artists and companies. Tenants include emerging and established artists, people with and without a university degree, and artists of diverse ethnicities.
• Hub 4 (UK) – is a maker-space that belongs to a University. Its business model involves supplying free space to small businesses. The Hub develops free weekly activities to engage artists, researchers, and entrepreneurs. It is based in an old factory with 15,000 ft² of space that includes co-working and project spaces to support entrepreneurs and facilities such as 3D printers, laser cutting machinery, virtual reality technology, and printing studios.
• Hub 5 (UK) – is a gallery with a café and offices. The Hub’s businesses model is based on a Fellowship programme, which takes on 14 new fellows per round and develops projects with universities and schools. It is located in an old post office building with a gallery, four working studios, a wet-lab and darkroom, a photography studio and co-working spaces.
• Hub 6 (Brazil) – is a global network of collaborative working spaces (co-working spaces). The hub provides workspace and meeting rooms, innovation labs and business incubators. In total, there are 24 leases with different small, medium and large enterprises, constituting a community of 120 people.
• Hub 7 (Brazil) – is a community that promotes parents’ collective action for early childhood development of their children. The hub was conceived and is managed by a group of parents residing in the districts of São Paulo west region. The community consists of approximately 16 families, approximately 40 members, The house has three areas: the area for a children education project, a theatre, and a co-working space.
• Hub 8 (Brazil) – is a University-based multidisciplinary laboratory that provides advanced features for engineering projects (software, hardware, 3D printers, mechanical and electronic workshops), with free access for undergraduate students.
• Hub 9 (Brazil) – is a cultural centre that began with an occupation of a Cement Factory that was abandoned in the 1970s. The Community has no legal identity and is formed by leaders of social movements, young people, and artists who live in the locality.
• Hub 10 (Brazil) – is a social space run by a non-profit cultural association. This association has organised a carnival parade group since 2009. The house contains 400 m² of space, and it is located in a central area of São Paulo. The carnival parade group began through cultural activism against real-estate speculation, and today is one of the biggest carnival parade groups in the city.

Six of the ten Hubs analysed are positioned within the Cultural Production Subfield, and four within the Innovation Production Subfield. Hub 5 does have characteristics found within both subfields, but its habitus relates more to the Innovation Production Subfield, so we consider its position as part of that subfield. All of the hubs positioned within the innovation production subfield have a relatively strong financial position, and have also received some funding from
a public or private investor. Most of the Hubs that are positioned within the Cultural Production Subfields exhibit a more precarious financial position, apart from Hub 1, which received public funding and is an Arts Council England National Portfolio Organisation, an important element of UK cultural public policy.

Hubs 9 and 10 did receive funding through public policy initiatives in Brazil, but this was not a guarantee of their economic sustainability. Hubs 1, 2, 5, and 10 have more autonomy in the realm of aesthetic experimentation compared to Hubs 4, 6, and 8, which undertake activities linked to large-scale products and intellectual property. Hubs 3, 8, and 9 do have a degree of autonomy, but their precarious situation is a limiting factor. Finally, all of the Hubs with economic sustainability are located in gentrified areas, while the more precarious Hubs are located in poor neighbourhoods, and Hubs with some level of autonomy are in regions undergoing a gentrification process.

**Micro-level - Capital analysis**

Medium-level analysis of data was undertaken to identify the ‘habitus’ of each hub, examining in particular: the dynamics of capital exchange; work dynamics; ideology; relationships to local communities; and connections to diverse markets. As Bourdieu has argued, ‘the structures constitutive of a particular type of environment produce the habitus, which is a system of dispositions, structured structures, predisposed to function as structuring structures’ (Bourdieu, 2001).

The medium-level analysis investigated the habitus of each hub, considering their dynamics of capital exchange and the forms of symbolic capital valorised by their networks. This analysis identified two distinct ecosystems: 1) cultural production (which includes both small-scale arts companies and larger-scale creative businesses) and 2) innovation production, which is associated with cross-disciplinary creative practice and businesses seeking to grow rapidly and attract...
investment. The ecosystems of these two subfields are distinct, but they also have some similar characteristics. All of the Hubs studied engage closely with their tenants, although these relationships take diverse forms. Tenants can be independent artists, cultural producers, start-ups, small businesses, entrepreneurs, or freelancers who establish networks to produce material and immaterial goods with high symbolic value. Tenants assume the risks of production within a logic of production based on projects, and typically have intermittent work.

Having identified within the microanalysis two types of Hub: the planned hub (internal community born after hub space was created); and the spontaneous hub (internal community formed before spaces was acquired), this distinction was also used to inform the medium-level analysis. Planned hubs understand their community as a group of people who collaborate to create new products and services. They focus primarily on larger-scale businesses in the fields of technology, design, and engineering. Planned hubs start with a degree of economic capital, and their cultural and social capital are then deployed to gain other funding.

The value of creativity for the ecosystem of these hubs is seen in its capacity to create solutions, as well as new products and innovative business models for a world in transformation. These planned hubs typically build on collaborative methods (open innovation, open search, design thinking), and co-create solutions within the disciplinary spaces of computer science, information technology, design, engineering, and digital economy, aiming to impact on economic development, and to generate valuable forms of IP. For example, in hubs 1, 2 (UK) and 6, 8 (Brazil) we can find convergence between several disciplines, (hubs 1, and 2) and the development of new companies, and new products (hub 8) with social impacts (hub 6) based on larger-scale economic development. These hubs have strong institutionalised cultural capital, and also have connections with important local and international institutions (strong social capital); these in turn facilitate access to economic capital.

We can find some significant differences between planned hubs studied in the UK and Brazil, however. Hubs 1 and 2 (UK) receive public funding and have access to funding through charitable foundations.

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<td>Creation new artistic languages, idea, promote socials and cultural causes</td>
<td>Creation of new ideas, promote the knowledge and development of new business models</td>
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**TABLE 1. COMPARATIVE BETWEEN INNOVATION PRODUCTION FIELD – HABITUS ANALYSIS**
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
In contrast, hubs 6 and 8 (Brazil), are independent of public financing. Hub 6 generates income through renting space to creative companies and has also received funding through angel investors and venture capital, and in both hubs 6 and 8 (Brazil), access to financial capital is related to these hubs’ ability to generate a return on investment.

‘Spontaneous’ hubs tend to understand ‘community’ as a local neighbourhood trying to create new ways of living, work and consume. They focus on place to foster art activism, cultural diversity, and social inclusion. For spontaneous hubs, their communities pre-date the creation of the hub space, and the symbolic capital of arts and culture is an essential value exchanged within their ecosystem. The Habitus typical within these hubs involves thinking of symbolic capital as a resource to enhance social inclusion, and framing the value of arts and culture in relation to their capacity to create new ways of living, working, and consuming. Spontaneous hubs focus on arts and cultural production (festival, exhibition, show, plays) to promote social equality, art activism, multiculturalism, and social inclusion represented in their sense of place and belonging.

Spontaneous hubs offers networks an environment with a high level of social and cultural capital exchange, and a relatively low emphasis on return on investment. Their business models involve renting space to small companies and independent artists, and promoting workshop, concerts, exhibition, festivals, and events. The dynamic of capital exchange in spontaneous hubs does demonstrate a degree of variability, however, with different degrees of dependence on public funding and different abilities to attract investment found across the various hubs to financial capital is more restricted.

Macro-level - Field analysis: Cultural/Innovation Sub-fields and Cultural Policy

The macro-analysis of data related to the ten hubs has made it possible to recognise the boundaries between the Culture and Innovation Production Subfields that are circumscribed distinctly within the cultural policies of the UK and of Brazil, as each country has distinct understandings of the role of arts, culture, and creativity in terms of excellence, social inclusion, and economic growth. For example, UK-based hubs two and five reflect the relationship between the cultural and creative industries and UK public policies related to urban development (in London and Birmingham). Hub 2 is located in an area that is the site of a significant urban regeneration project, which attracts a range of funders including the Department of Energy, Business and Industrial Strategy; the European Regional Development Fund, the British Council and the Arts Council. This suggests an important convergence between urban development and cultural policy that is distinct from the cultural policy landscape in Brazil.

The macro-level analysis of the five Brazilian hubs reflected a clear separation between the Cultural and Innovation Production Subfield within public policies. Hub 10 accessed resources via PRONAC - National Cultural Support Program and local cultural policies. Hub 9 also reflects the impacts of local cultural policies, specifically the funding for spaces in urban peripheries. These programs are part of the national and local funding system, and both follow the same rules. In Brazil, every year agents and institutions, need to start a proposal framing project, for approval and fundraising for each year. This logic creates a specific cycle within its management process. This process poses a constant risk for institutions, even those with more recognized cultural capital once the project’s framing and fundraising cycles create a dependence on federal and local public administrations and instability in terms of economic sustainability. In the case of UK policies, specifically, those Hub, which is part of the National Portfolio, received funding for three years and guarantee more stability in terms of economic sustainability.

The relationship between cultural policies and innovation policies found in the United Kingdom context is much less evident in the Brazilian context. Hub 6 is part of a global co-working franchise model
imported from the UK and, as such, has attracted the attention of many public managers in Brazil, but it did not receive public funding. Innovation policies in Brazil have no political or institutional link with cultural policies at this time, having been managed by the Ministry of Innovation, Technology and Science (recently integrated into the Ministry of Communication which created some programs to invest in start-ups). The political and economic crisis that Brazil is experiencing makes it difficult to imagine any effective integration of the subfields of innovation and culture shortly.

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When observing the cultural policy of the two countries three aspects that could be used as a parameter for comparison were identified. The first aspect is the continuity of public policies. British cultural policies were instituted in 1997, and after 12 years, these policies remain as strategic policies for the country. In the case of Brazil, since its creation, cultural policies have had two periods of instability and absence, and little efforts have been made to integrate cultural policies with other public policies. Another important aspect is the funding mechanisms. In Brazil, the culture financing mechanism is regulated by the National Cultural Support Program and is local. In the UK, however, funding is provided by an arts financing agency (The Arts Council), which invests directly through the National Portfolio.

A final aspect to consider is how the Cultural and Creative Production Field is circumscribed by Cultural Policies. In the case of Brazil, the paradigms that consolidated cultural policies were those of Culture 1.0 and 2.0. It is possible to identify through its financing mechanisms that the sectors covered by cultural policies are the arts: heritage, visual arts, performing arts, museums, festivals and the cultural industries, audiovisual, recorded music, publications—demonstrating no convergence between the Cultural and Inovation Production Subfield. In the United Kingdom, the paradigms that consolidated cultural policies were Culture 1.0, Culture 2.0 and Culture 3.0. It is possible to identify through the financing mechanisms that the sectors contemplated are those traditionally linked to the phases of Culture 1.0 and 2.0, however it was possible to recognize a set of actions financed by cultural policies integrated with other public policies, such as urban development policies clearly showing an influence of the Culture paradigm 3.0.

**Conclusion**

Analyzing the Brazilian Hubs, it was possible to identify the participation of social movements in culture and the presence of programs to foster community-based cultural production. Most of the Hubs analyzed in Brazil are positioned in the Cultural Production Subfield. Only two of the Hubs positioned in the left quadrants (Subfield of Production of Innovation) presented evidence of any financing from any public agency, which suggests a lack of convergence between the Subfield of Cultural Production and Innovation. One of the aspects identified in the research on UK’s Hubs was the importance of European Union Funds for the financing of Creative Hubs. It was possible to locate in these cases a convergence between the Subfield of Cultural Production and Innovation. Research on Hubs in the United Kingdom has shown that local cultural policies promote an intersection between art, culture and creativity focussed on their economic impacts, which could be evidence of the Culture 3.0 paradigm. UK cultural policies have characteristics of the three phases of cultural policies and integrate the three paradigms of the arts, culture and creativity and develop integrative public policies that relate the paradigms of culture 1.0, 2.0 and 3.0. In Brazil, cultural policy actions are not integrated with other public policies and are related to Culture 1.0 and Culture 2.0 paradigms.

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